Poverty alleviation is an important policy objective in developed welfare states. This paper analyzes the effect of social transfer policies on poverty. A vast literature claims that high social effort goes along with low poverty levels across countries. This paper systematically analyzes this claim. We employ several social expenditure ratios (as a proxy for social effort) and correct for the impact of the tax system and for private social arrangements, using OECD methodology. Also, we control for demographic and macro-economic differences across countries. We performed several tests with the most recent data (LIS, OECD, and SOCX) for the period 1985-2005. Our results are less clear-cut than earlier findings. We still find quite a strong negative relationship between the level of public social expenditure and poverty among 28 OECD countries. However, for non-EU15 countries this relationship is stronger than for the EU15. The results alter considerably if private social expenditures are included as well. For non-EU15 countries in our sample, we do not find evidence for a negative correlation between the level of total social spending and the incidence of poverty. In contrast, for the group of EU15 countries private social arrangements do matter as far as poverty alleviation is concerned. Demographic and macro-economic (control) variables are important as well. We developed and employed multiple linear regression models to control for these complex interrelationships. Our results point at one direction: gross social spending is the driving force as far as differences in poverty levels across countries are concerned, although the ageing of the population and unemployment rates have some explanatory power, both for non-EU15 countries and for EU15 countries. Our analyses captures another effect as well. It is essential to control for the impact of taxes on the social expenditure ratios used. By doing so, the linkage between social effort and poverty levels across countries becomes insignificant. In view of the fact that with these corrections on expenditure statistics, we have a much better -although still not perfect -measure of what governments really devote to social spending, the familiar claim that higher social expenditure goes along with lower poverty levels does not hold across the 28 examined countries examined. We believe that our comparison of the impact of several social expenditure ratios on poverty levels has emphasized that taking into account both the public/private-mix and the impact of the tax system on social expenditure ratios really matters for comparative welfare state research and for policy makers who want to reduce poverty. JEL-codes: H53, H55, I32
"Policy makers and citizens react to information on the level of poverty, international comparisons of poverty, and analyses of the composition of poverty. A high poverty rate relative to peers is embarrassing, triggers concerns regarding inequality in the distribution of income, and elicits calls for changes in the extent
and effectiveness of policy interventions to reduce poverty." (Haveman, 2008, p. 5) "The number of people living below the poverty line and in social exclusion in the Union is unacceptable. Steps must be taken to make a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty ..." (Presidency conclusion, Lisbon European Council, March 2000).
INTRODUCTION
The poverty problem is striking in highly-developed welfare states. Industrialized countries spend a large share of their income on social security, but poverty has not been eradicated. A sizeable proportion of the population lives in economic poverty in all industrial welfare states. According to the most common standards used in international poverty analyses, on average roughly one in ten households live in relative poverty in OECD countries (cf. Atkinson et al. 1995; Behrendt 2002; Smeeding, 2005; OECD, 2008) . The European Union especially encourages Member States to combat poverty (Caminada and Goudswaard, 2009a) . In the EU people are said to be at risk of income poverty if their incomes are below 60 per cent of the median disposable income of households in their country, after adjusting for household size (equivalence scales).
1 Based on this EU-agreed definition, the proportion of the EU25-population who were at risk of poverty in 2007 is 16 percent. This means that around 78 million citizens are considered as being at risk of poverty; one fourth are children, one fifth are elderly, one fifth are working poor, twelve percent are unemployed and one fourth are inactive people of working age (European Commission, 2009, p. 38) . In the smaller subset of EU15 countries differences range from 10 up till 20 percent of total population. The persistence of poverty in industrial welfare states calls for an explanation. If these welfare states offer elaborate systems of income maintenance, why is there still a considerable amount of poverty? This paper analyzes the effectiveness of income transfer policies in European (EU15) and other OECD countries in alleviating poverty. A vast literature claims that high social effort goes along with low poverty levels across countries. Noland and Marx (2009, p. 329-330) state that "there is a strong relationship at country level between the level of social spending and the incidence of poverty " -"arguably one of the most robust findings in comparative poverty research". The strong cross-country association between high welfare state effort and low poverty would suggest that increasing spending in currently low-effort countries would
There are three common ways of setting the poverty line: an absolute standard, a relative standard, and a subjective standard. The U.S. poverty threshold is based on an absolute poverty standard (Orshansky-poverty), which remains fixed over time in real terms. The EUagreed relative poverty line is set as a fixed percentage of the median income in each country, which may change over time if median income changes in real terms. The subjective poverty line is based on respondents' answers to questions regarding what they consider an adequate standard of living. 5 Following international standards, we use the relative rather than the absolute or subjective approach in measuring income poverty. This means, we define those households that have an equivalent disposable income below a certain threshold representing the level of well-being of the population in a specific country as being poor. In our empirical analysis, we use several thresholds for a poverty line (40 percent, 50 percent, and 60 percent), because the absolute number as well as the structure of poverty differ to a large extent depending on the threshold chosen. 6 In most comparative studies the poverty threshold has been set at 50 percent of median equivalent disposable income, but we also employ the EU-agreed definition of poverty and the 40 percent poverty line. For comparison, the official United States poverty line was just about 30 percent of median United States disposable post-tax household income in 2007.
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It should be noted that there have been controversial arguments regarding the issues in the measurement of poverty. These arguments have their own merits and shortcomings, and there has been little professional consensus among researchers with regard to the theoretical superiority of a particular way of measuring poverty (Haveman, 2008) . Moreover, the availability of reliable data restricts the possibilities for conducting empirical research, which is especially problematic in cross-national studies. The aim of this paper is not to review definitional issues that arise in assessing the extent of, and change in, poverty in Western industrialized countries. We simply refer to a vast literature on the sensitivity of measured results to the choice of income definitions, poverty lines, appropriate equivalence scales, and other elements that may affect results in comparative poverty research. 9 and social security contributions. However broad, this definition excludes capital gains, imputed rents, other unrealized types of capital income, home production, and in-kind income (Brandolini and Smeeding, 2007) . 5 Some researchers have measured poverty by relying on the subjective responses of individuals to questions about their perceptions of economic position or well-being, relative to some norm. This approach to poverty measurement is associated with the "Leyden School". See Van Praag (1968) , Hagenaars (1986) and Van Praag, Hagenaars, and Van Weeren (1982) . These subjective measures survey households and ask them to specify the minimum level of income or consumption they consider to be "just sufficient" to allow them to live a minimally adequate lifestyle. If respondents indicate that their own level of living either exceeds or falls. short of what they consider to be 'minimally adequate' monetary poverty line, a poverty rate can be estimated from observations of actual income. While attractive, subjective measures are based on individual opinions of what constitutes "minimally adequate" or "enough to get by." Hence establishing an overall poverty rate requires an assumption that individual perceptions of these notions reflect the same level of real welfare for all respondents. The effectiveness of subjective measures is limited by the small sample sizes on which they are based; most estimates show wide variation around the mean (Haveman, 2008, p. 13-14) . 6 Hagenaars and De Vos (1987) applied eight definitions for a poverty line to a 1983 household survey for the Netherlands: four definitions based on an absolute approach, three on a subjective and one a relative measure. The derived overall poverty rates ranged from 5.7 to 33.5 percent. 7 U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey reports for 2007 a poverty threshold for a 4-persons family (weighted average) of $21,203; median disposable income for 4-persons families amounts $69,654. 8 Although US poverty is much higher than poverty in Europe when a relative poverty measure is used, using the official absolute poverty measurement from the US (Orshansky-poverty) alters the picture; see Notten and De Neubourg (2007) . Their estimates according to the Orshansky-methodology for 1996 and 2000 show (still) high USA poverty rates, but not that much difference with most European countries, while Greece, Spain and Portugal even have figures four times higher than the USA. It should be noted that this result is highly sensitive for the purchasing power parity rates used to convert the US poverty lines to country specific thresholds of EU15. 9 Among others, see Atkinson (1987 and 2003) , Hagenaars and De Vos (1987) , Förster (1993) , Atkinson et al (1995) , Behrendt (2000) , Smeeding (1997 and , Smeeding et al (2000) , Marcus and Danziger (2000) , Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) , Goudswaard (2001 and , Förster and Pearson (2002) , Smeeding (2005 and , Guio (2005) , Förster and Mira d'Ercole (2005) , OECD (2008) and (other) papers listed in our reference section using data from the Luxembourg Income Study. Recent comprehensive reviews on methodological assumptions underlying international levels and trends in inequality are found in Brandolini and Smeeding (2007 and . See Bourguignon et al (2002) for a more elaborated paper on the evaluation of poverty impact of economic policies.
Measuring social effort
The overall result of quantitative studies seems to be that there is strong negative correlation between poverty and social expenditures across European countries over the last 25 years (Behrendt, 2002) . For example, the European Commission (2009, p. 27) states that across the EU, the countries with the lowest poverty rates are clearly those who spend most on social benefits. Smeeding claims in several papers (2006, p. 80; and 2005, p. 974 ) that higher levels of government spending as in Scandinavia and Northern Europe and more careful targeting of government transfers on the poor as in Canada, Sweden and Finland produce lower poverty rates. Noland and Marx (2009, p. 329-330) state that "there is a strong relationship at country level between the level of social spending and the incidence of poverty " -"arguably one of the most robust findings in comparative poverty research". The strong cross-country association between high welfare state effort and low poverty would suggest that increasing spending in currently low-effort countries would lead to a downward convergence in poverty outcomes.
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To investigate this familiar claim systematically, we employ several social expenditure ratios from the most recent OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX, 2008) . This database contains aggregate and disaggregated data on social expenditures. The main social policy areas included are old age, survivors, family, health and other social programs. Both cash benefits and benefits in kind are included. The OECD defines social expenditures as 'the provision by public and private institutions of benefits to, and financial contributions targeted at, households and individuals in order to provide support during circumstances which adversely affect their welfare, provided that the provision of the benefits and financial contributions constitutes neither a direct payment for a particular good or service nor an individual contract or transfer' (OECD 2007, p. 6) . Since only benefits provided by institutions are included in the social expenditure definition, transfers between households -albeit of a social nature -are not in the social domain. Social benefits include cash benefits (e.g. pensions, income support during maternity leave, and social assistance payments), social services (e.g. childcare, care for the elderly and disabled) and tax breaks with a social purpose (e.g. tax expenditures towards families with children, or favorable tax treatment of contributions to private health plans). In this study we perform several tests at the aggregate level, because there is no one program or one type of policy instrument that is universally generous and common across nations, and yet they all generate redistribution albeit of different magnitude. 11 It should be noted that social expenditure indicators at the aggregate level have their limitations (Kühner, 2007) : changes in expenditure ratios may not be caused by policy changes, but simply by the number of beneficiaries as a result of an ageing population or changes in unemployment levels due to cyclical factors (see also section 2.3). However, we will test the relationship between poverty rates and social expenditures across countries at several moments in time (around 1985, 1995, and 2005) to analyze the influence of the business cycle. In addition, we take demographic effects into account. One might question whether the results that we capture are merely reflections of EU15 countries -because we will apply a relative poverty line -or of the other nations as well. In order to investigate this question, we include observation for 13 non-EU15 countries for which we have both measures of social spending and measures of income poverty. Moreover, these non-EU15 countries may shine some light on the effects of European policy combating poverty.
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10 However, Cantillon et al (2003) show that increasing social expenditures within the existing social transfer system of nine EU Member States would not always have a strong effect on poverty rates since additional spending would end up disproportionally with those already above the poverty line. 11 We refer to related work. Caminada and Goudwaard (2009b) perform a cross-national analysis on poverty reduction through the tax/transfer system -both for the entire population and several vulnerable age groups such as children and the elderly -at the program level as well. Data on poverty rates and poverty alleviation among OECD countries, and correlation tests are available from Caminada's webpage. Click here. 12 It should be noted that the EU has not been afforded legislative competence to harmonize national laws in this field, though the Open Method of Coordination of the EU seeks both to stimulate domestic policy It is also necessary to take into account the role of private resources and services/benefits in ensuring adequate protection in addition to those provided by public systems. In particular, the extent to which social protection systems redistribute resources towards low-income groups, thus helping to reduce the poverty risk, depends on the structure of social protection expenditure. A problem with social expenditure as an indicator for differences in social protection across countries, is related to differences in the public/private mix in the provision of social protection and differences in features of the tax system. Adema (2001) has developed indicators that aim at measuring the share of an economy's domestic production recipients of social benefits really draw on, net total social expenditure. This requires capturing private social benefits and the impact of tax systems on social effort. For private programs to be considered 'social', they need to have a social purpose and contain an element of interpersonal redistribution and/or compulsory participation. 14 The distinction between public and private social protection is made on the basis of whoever controls the relevant financial flows. Private social benefits may be important for our analysis. In so far they contain an element of redistribution, they may also have an impact on poverty levels. For example, private but mandatory pensions (in the second pillar) may have an effect on poverty incidence among the elderly. However, the impact of private social benefits is likely to be smaller than the impact of public social transfers. The impact of the tax system on the social effort is threefold. In some countries cash benefits are taxable as a rule, in other countries they are not. In the former countries net social effort is less than suggested by gross spending indicators. Indirect taxation of consumption by benefit recipients is another factor that may blur the picture. When indirect taxes are higher, benefit recipients have less effective purchasing power. And thirdly, the tax system can be used for social purposes. Tax deductions (e.g. family tax allowances) replace direct expenditures in some cases. The Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States is a good example of a tax break, which has the features of a social protection program. To control for the impact of tax systems on social spending, we will use the OECD data on net social expenditure. Unfortunately, these data only cover a relatively short time period (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) as well as a small group of countries. The most recent figures of the net social expenditure as percentage of GDP, based on the 2008 edition of the Net Social Expenditure data, indicate that accounting for the impact of taxes and of private social expenditure has an equalizing effect on levels of social effort across countries; see Caminada and Goudswaard (2005) .
Tests on the linkages between social protection and poverty
National preferences for social protection differ substantially across countries. Especially Anglo-Saxon countries do not seem to be prepared to sustain the high protection levels prevailing in other countries with the same level of income. Swabish et al (2006) assembled data to examine the cross-national effects of income inequality and trust on social expenditures. Their results suggest that as the 'rich' become more distant from the middle processes and to provide a coordinating framework for member states to exchange policy ideas and practices. OMC combines centralized processes of European objective setting, performance measurement (in line with agreed indicators) and evaluation (joint review by the European Commission and Council of Ministers) with the decentralized production of National Action Plans on Inclusion; see Armstrong, 2006, p. 80) . However, compared to other modes of EU governance and even compared to the economic and employment coordination processes, the social inclusion process is weakly institutionalized in the EU treaty system and is ultimately voluntary (albeit that the commitments to the aims of the process and the process itself have been endorsed at the highest level-the European Council). 13 It should be mentioned that European non-EU15 countries as Czech Republic, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Switzerland, or even Turkey may also be influenced by European integration, for example via policy competition. 14 Private social programs can be mandatory or voluntary. Mandatory private benefits are often incapacity related. For example, in several countries employers are obliged to provide sickness benefits. Occupational injuries and accidents ('risque professionel') can also be covered by mandatory private insurances. A number of EU member states have supplementary employment-based pension plans with mandatory contributions, based on a funding system. Voluntary private social security covers a wide range of programs, of which private pension plans and private social health insurance constitute major components.
and lower classes, they find it easier to opt out of public programs and to buy substitutes for social insurance in the private market. These cultural differences within the group of OECD countries could point to variance in the antipoverty nature of social systems as well. AngloSaxon welfare states (especially the United States) rely more heavily on private social arrangements as far as pensions, health care and other programs are concerned (Super, 2008) . However, private social programs may generate a more limited redistribution of resources than public ones, and tax advantages towards private pension and health plans are more likely to benefit the rich. Private employment-related social benefits mostly re-allocate income between the (formerly) employed population. The same holds for fiscal advantages related to, for example, supplementary private pension plans. In general, we do expect that private schemes will generate less antipoverty effects than public programs. We perform a cross-county analysis of the relationship between (public and private) social expenditures and poverty rates at one moment in time. The material presented is only descriptive and does not explain poverty levels and poverty structure. Such an analysis should ideally be based on a theory, which would have to address at least the following crossnational differences (cf. Gottschalk and Smeeding, 2000, p.263) : differences in labor markets that affect earnings of individual household members; demographic differences, such as the ageing of the population and growth of single parent households, which affect both family needs and labor market decisions; and differences across countries in tax and transfers policies that not only affect family income directly, but also may affect work and investment decisions. Two recent seminal books edited by Kakwani and Silber (2007 and present the panorama of the many dimensions of poverty from various disciplines. Duclos et al (2007, p. 244) state that it is a common assertion that poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon, yet most empirical work on poverty uses one-dimensional yardstick, usually household expenditures or income per capita or per adult equivalent, to judge a person's well-being. When studies use more than one indicator of well-being, poverty of comparisons are either made for each indicator independently of the others, or are performed using a arbitrary defined aggregation of multiple indicators into a single index. In either case aggregation across multiple welfare indicators, and across the welfare statuses of individuals or households, requires specific aggregation rules that are necessarily arbitrary. Therefore, a multidimensional approach is not an attractive route for empirical research. 15 A fully-fledged model should be developed to assess the relative performance of social factors and the economic development. Such a comprehensive approach is far beyond the scope of this paper. Still, critics argue for a multidimensional poverty concept. In addition, assessing the impact of government intervention on the risk of poverty is a complex task, since a broad range of government policies influence the actual living standards of households. How to proceed? We simply believe that social protection expenditure plays a decisive role in reducing the risk of poverty. Therefore, we employ bi-variate and multiple regressions on the relationship between poverty rates and social expenditures, and other commonsense control variables as the ratio of the elderly population (for old age pensions), the unemployment rate (for the business cycle), and GDP per capita US dollars (PPS). Nevertheless, one could argue that omitted (macroeconomic) variables cause bias. Indeed, differences in social effort across countries at one point in time can be the result of numerous factors. Although our analysis focus on the income dimension of poverty, it should be mentioned that the European Union has emphasized the multidimensional nature of deprivation, and has developed supplementary indicators of poverty based on social indicators and the broad concept of social exclusion. The European Union has defined common objectives on social indicators -based on Atkinson et al (2002) A considerable share of the population lives in relative income poverty in all industrialized welfare states, yet with a large variation of poverty rates and structure across countries. All countries in this sample display poverty rates in a range of 10.0 to 25.3 percent of the household population if the poverty line is set at 60 percent of median equivalent household income. When large proportions of the population are clustered just around the threshold of 60 percent, small changes in their income can lead to large changes in poverty. To examine the sensitivity of these results to alternative choices of the poverty line, Table 1 also shows poverty rates measured with lower thresholds. It turns out that, in all countries reviewed, a significant share of the population is clustered between the 50 and 60 percent thresholds. This explains also why poverty statistics with a threshold of 50 percent are much lower compared to the official EU-indicator (with a threshold of 60 percent of median equivalized income).
Note that poverty indices from different sources alter the country-ranking to some extent. There are minor differences with regard to the methodology applied. The concept of disposable income is quasi-identical between the three data sources (OECD, 2008, p. 153) . The equivalence scale used by Eurostat differs only slightly from the one used by the OECD and LIS, giving a somewhat higher weight to additional household members and distinguishing between adults and children. 17 Figure 1 shows estimates of poverty indicators from OECD, LIS, and Eurostat. Poverty data of OECD and LIS are highly correlated (around .94). Correlation coefficients for poverty rates between Eurostat and both OECD and LIS are lower and range from .73 to .96, depending on the poverty threshold applied. For most countries differences in poverty rates from OECD and from LIS do not exceed 2 percentage points, with exceptions for Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom. However, between Eurostat and both OECD and LIS, we find rather large differences in poverty rates exceeding 2 percentage points for Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom. Adjusted disposable income (ADPI) is equal to unadjusted household income (DPI) divided by household size (S) raised to an exponential value (e), ADPI=DPI/S e . OECD and LIS assume the value of e is 0.5. Eurostat (2005, p. 63 ) use the so-called 'modified OECD' equivalence scale. This scale gives a weight of 1.0 to the first adult, 0.5 to any other household member aged 14 and over and 0.3 to each child. The resulting figure is attributed to each member of the household, whether adult or children. The equivalent size of a household that consists of 2 adults and 2 children below the age of 14 is therefore: 1.0 + 0.5 + (2*0.3) = 2.1.
Linkages between poverty rates and gross social spending
As mentioned earlier, quantitative studies have found a strong negative relationship between poverty rates and the level of social expenditure over the last 25 years; this finding has now been well established in empirical studies. 18 In other words, countries with a higher level of welfare expenditure are likely to have lower poverty rates. Our simple linkage exercise confirms the general finding that more social spending generates less poverty across countries. However, our results are less clear-cut than earlier findings. We find an effect which is less strong in EU15 countries compared to non-EU15 countries, possibly under the influence of welfare state reforms (cf. Adelantado and Caldéron Cuevas, 2006) . This result does not depend on the poverty line applied (40, 50 or 60-percent-of-median-income poverty threshold); see Figure 3 . Moreover, we did a sensitivity analysis with the LIS poverty data -reported in Table A2 of the Appendix -and found the same result: higher gross public social expenditure ratios generates less poverty across countries, although this effect is less strong in EU15 countries compared to non-EU15 countries.
The impact of private social expenditure
In recent years considerable progress has been made in empirical research on the impact of social protection systems on income inequality and poverty, but most analyses focused on public arrangements (e.g. Swabish et al, 2006; Smeeding, 2005 and . Up till now, also our results support the conventional view that extensive social-welfare programs reduce poverty. These findings may be influenced by ignoring the impact of private social arrangements.
Our sample shows that the share of public social benefits in total social expenditures exceeds 85 percent in most countries. The role of private arrangements of varying nature in providing close substitutes to public social protection expenditure is considerable in some OECD countries. In the Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, the share of private social expenditure is more than 25 percent, while in the US this share is almost 40 percent. Moreover, in all countries other than Austria and Ireland private social expenditures have risen in the period 1985-2005 -in some countries rather rapidly. There may be various explanations for this increase in private social expenditure (Caminada and Goudswaard, 2005) . Lower public protection may induce private social arrangements of a different nature. But a shift from public to private provision of social protection can also be an explicit policy objective, to alleviate public budgets, or to strengthen incentives in the system (Super, 2008) . Anyway, accounting for private social expenditures is important for judging the social effort and the level of social protection in countries. But what about the effect of private social arrangements on poverty rates? It is plausible that the redistributive effects of transfers are weaker in countries where the social transfer system mostly relies on (partly private) earnings-related schemes compared to countries with mostly (public) means-tested provisions of transfers. Means tested public transfers are, almost by definition, better targeted to the poor. In general, we expect poverty to be relatively high (low) in countries where the share of private arrangement in the total social benefits is relatively high (low).
In Figure 3 , we have included private social arrangements in our social expenditure indicator for 2005, using the OECD data as developed by Adema (2001) . Again, we apply the 40-, 50-, and 60-percent-of-median-income poverty thresholds, and use the OECD-data on poverty. The results alter considerably if private social expenditures are included as well. For non-EU15 countries in our sample, we do not find evidence for a negative correlation between the level of gross total social spending and the incidence of poverty (p>.10): Adjusted R 2 ranges from .12 to .15, depending on the poverty line applied. Since there is no clear and strong negative link, more social spending does not offer an easy route to less poverty within these countries. In contrast, for the group of EU15 countries, we find a significant fit (p<.01): Adjusted R 2 ranges from .44 to .59, depending on the poverty line applied. Cross country data show evidence that private social expenditure does seem to matter as far as poverty alleviation in EU15 is concerned (higher adjusted correlation coefficients R 2 compared to the gross public social expenditure ratio in Figure 2 ). Apparently, private social arrangements have more redistributive impact in EU15 than in other OECD countries.
To test for robustness of the relationship between poverty rates and gross total social expenditures across countries, we employed a sensitivity analysis. The results are independent of both the poverty line applied and the source of poverty data (OECD or LIS).
See Tables A1 and A2 of the Appendix for details.
The impact of the tax system
Another problem with social expenditure as an indicator for differences in social protection across countries is related to ignoring the impact of the tax system. In Figure 4 , we have corrected the expenditure ratios for the impact of the tax system, using the OECD data mentioned earlier. 19 We have linked the poverty rates around [2003] [2004] [2005] to net total social expenditures of 2005. At one moment in time, the linkage effect of net total social expenditure ratios and poverty rates across countries turns out to be less strong compared to the effect of gross total spending (much lower adjusted correlation coefficients R 2 in all cases). Moreover, if social expenditures are corrected for the impact of tax systems, we do not find a significant correlation for the EU15 countries and the non-EU15 countries separately. Also for all countries together, we do not find a good fit (p>.10). We conclude that the conventional view that welfare spending goes along with less poverty must at least be mitigated (cf. Esping-Andersen, 2009, p. 644) . The linkage between the two variables becomes substantially weaker -and even turns out to be insignificant -if the expenditure data are corrected for relevant tax features, which gives a more realistic picture. One could argue either way: health expenditures generally do not qualify as income transfers; at the same time health programs are an important element of the safety net in most countries, probably generating large antipoverty effects through benefits in kinds and taxes (contributions). We undertake a pragmatic approach, because including or neglecting health expenditure will affect our empirical analysis to a large extent. We employ a sensitive analysis for social spending other than for health programs as well. 20 To exclude health expenditures, we unfortunately have to use gross rather than net social expenditures for this analysis, however, both gross public and gross private social arrangement are taken into account. For EU15 countries the treatment of health expenditures does not alter the prior result that much; see Figure 6 . However, excluding health expenditures generate considerable better fits for non-EU15 countries, especially because the United States is an outlier with relatively high social expenditures for (private) health programs. Converting the point estimates to elasticities implies that a one percent increase of gross public and private social spending other than health expenditures decrease poverty rates by approximately .5-.7 percent in the group non-EU15 countries, depending on the poverty line applied. The elasticity estimate is somewhat higher and show more variation for EU15 countries (-.4-.8), indicating that social programs are not yet targeted well to the ones around the EU-agreed 60 percent poverty line. Smeeding (2005 and has analyzed why the United States is different from other countries. Government policies and social spending have lesser effects in the United States than in any other rich nations, and both low spending and low wages have a great impact on the final income distribution, especially among the non-elderly (Smeeding, 2005, p. 955) . His analysis points to American institutions and lack of spending effort on behalf of low-income working families. Indeed, the United States stands out in the relative position of those at the bottom of the income distribution. But does it also reflect the relative weakness of the income support system in the United States? The answer to this question heavily depends on the social expenditure indicator used. 21 Smeeding examined the generosity of income transfer programs by tracing the trend in non-elderly cash and nearcash (food, housing) benefits for OECD countries over the past 20 years. He concludes (p. 970): "Even before the 'Bush revolution', we are a distinct lower-bound outlier in social spending on the non-elderly." Moreover, his thoroughly analysis shows that higher levels of government spending (as in Scandinavia and northern Europe) and more careful targeting of government transfers at the poor (as in Canada, Sweden, and Finland) produce lower poverty rates. Smeeding finds that the effects of the income package accounted for over 90 percent of the differences in income inequality across nations. He claims that the U.S. redistributive package is the prime explainer of the differences. This conclusion seems to contradict our finding in this paper so far: there is no clear relation between (high) social expenditures and (low) poverty rates across countries. Indeed, different nations use different instruments and different 'income packages' to reduce poverty. For this reason, we analyzed the 'whole' package (total social spending), with the only exception for excluding health expenditure on one occasion. It should be noted that the United States scores both very high and very low when counties are ranked according to their levels of social spending, depending on the specific indicator used. We examined 28 countries for the year 2005. The United States ranks fifth (!) in case net total (public and private) social expenditures are used as an indicator. So, America cannot be classified as a lower-bound outlier. However, if we look at gross public social expenditure only Turkey and Mexico allocate less to social spending, independent whether health programs are included. Notably, the United States spent most of all countries on private social expenditures! Their private/publicratio increased sharply during the last decades; this may be an explanation why America has lesser redistribution (less effective as an anti-poverty device) than other rich nations. The importance of this public/private-shift mechanism is acknowledged by Swabish, Smeeding and Osberg (2005, p. 33) : as 'rich' become more distant from the middle and lower class -such as in the United States -they find it easier to opt out of public programs and to buy substitutes for social insurance in the private market. Note that we find pretty good fits for gross public social expenditures, both for non-EU15 and EU15 countries. The inclusion of private social expenditure alters the picture. Still, we find a significant negative relationship between gross public and private spending and poverty rates for all countries, but not for non-EU15 countries separately. In contrast, including private social benefits helps to reduce poverty levels in EU15 countries. Excluding social expenditures for health programs improves the correlation between (high) social spending and (low) poverty rates for non-EU15 countries, however, still this relationship is much weaker than for EU15 countries. For all countries it appears that taking into account private arrangements considerably lowers the impact of social expenditures on poverty levels. Furthermore, the impact of the tax systems is important. We do not find a significant linkage for non-EU15 countries and EU15 countries separately. So, the linkage between net total social expenditure and poverty levels is much weaker than in case the traditional indicator gross public social spending is used. We find ample evidence for a relationship between (high) net total social expenditure and (low) poverty across countries.
Summing-up
We believe that our comparison of the impact of several social expenditure ratios on poverty levels in the United States and other non-EU15 and EU15 countries has emphasized that taking into account the public/private-mix really matters for comparative welfare state research. We are able to include 24 countries in our sample, however, data for net social spending is lacking. Therefore, we perform our sensitivity analysis with several gross social indicators.
Poverty over time
First, we show cross-national trends in poverty indicators. OECD data shows also that poverty rose at a higher rate in EU15 member states than elsewhere. Although this trend is independent of the source used (LIS or OECD), Belgium seems to be a specific case. Among LIS-countries Belgium experienced a relatively sharp increase of poverty rates (+3.6 points), while OECD-data showed a notable decline (-4.2 points).
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In general, relative poverty is higher in most nations at the end of the period compared to the beginning. 23 Over time, cross-country variation, as measured by the coefficient of variation, decreased modestly on average.
22 OECD (2008, p. 148) reports that data for Belgium are based on fiscal data and are not strictly comparable over time. Alternative estimates based on household surveys from the University of Antwerp suggest broad stability of poverty rates in the late 1980s and a slight increase in the first half of the 1990s. 23 Here, we do not breakdown poverty rate of total population into vulnerable (age) groups. Indeed, some (age) groups are typically over-represented among the poor -the vulnerable for whom social programs are supposed to guarantee a minimum income -as children and the elderly. Caminada and Goudswaard (2009a) analyze on a cross-country basis how social income transfers affect their poverty status. 
Linkages between poverty rates and gross social spending over time
To test for (in)stability over time, we investigate the relationship between poverty rates and several gross social expenditure indicators for a few moments in time for all countries. We regressed level of poverty rates across countries with the level of several social expenditure ratios. The coefficients are estimated using a linear ordinary least square regression model of cross-sectional data of the following form:
The term on the left-hand side of equation (1) is the level of the poverty indicator of country i at time-period t. The level of gross social expenditure as percentage of GDP in country i at period t is given by X i , t , and u i,t is a disturbance term. If the coefficient β is negative, we say that gross social expenditures alleviate poverty across countries. A is the intercept. The higher the value of β, the stronger the antipoverty effect of an additional point of GDP spend on social expenditure. Table 4 presents the results of our simple OLS-regression analysis for three moments in time; around the mid-1980's, the mid-1990's, and the mid-2000's. Here a 50 percent-of-medianincome poverty threshold is applied to OECD poverty rates; the analogous regressions using LIS poverty rates with a 60 percent poverty line are reported in Appendix Tables A3. Our findings for both OECD and LIS poverty rates are rather similar, and steady over time. The results are sensitive to the social indicator used. We find pretty good fits for gross public social expenditures, both for non-EU15 and EU15 countries. However, the inclusion of private social expenditures alters the picture. Still, we find a significant negative relationship between social spending and poverty rates for all countries and for EU15 countries, but not for non-EU15 countries separately. We find a fit again for non-EU15 countries when social expenditures for health programs are excluded from social spending ratios. We conclude that the relationship between poverty rates and gross social spending across countries is rather insensitive to the business cycle, but does depend on the social spending indicator used. 
General framework
To see whether demographic and other factors play a role, we include independent variables in respective regression estimations measuring the ratio of the elderly population (for old age pensions), the unemployment rate of total labor force (for the business cycle), and GDP per capita US dollars current prices and PPS (as a proxy of rich countries). These seem to be the most relevant (control) variables to be examined in a cross country perspective. 25 We begin by specifying a reduced form equation to explore the relationship between social expenditures and poverty rates:
Poverty rates = f {Social expenditure, Proportion elderly, Unemployment rate, GDP per capita}.
Again, we regress level of poverty rates across countries (Y) with the level of gross social expenditure as percentage of GDP (X1), with and without all other variable mentioned (X2 … Xn). Coefficients are estimated using a linear ordinary least square regression model of crosssectional data of the following form:
The term on the left-hand side of equation (2) is the level of the poverty indicator of country i at time-period t. The level of gross social expenditure as percentage of GDP in country i at period t is given by X1 i , t , the percentage of population aged 65 and above X2 i , t , and so forth. u i,t is a disturbance term. If the coefficient β is negative, we say that social expenditures alleviate poverty across countries. A is the intercept. The higher the value of β, the larger will be the antipoverty effect of an additional point of GDP spend on social expenditure.
We are interested in the effects that social expenditure have on poverty rates; the remaining covariates are included as controls for various social, demographic, and economic institutions. For the empirical model comparable poverty rates are directly generated from OECD (2008); a 50 percent median income poverty line is applied. SOCX (2008) offers us practical options for dependent variables: gross total social expenditures (total; public; private), and gross total social expenditures other than for health programs. Our control variables come from OECD (2009). It should be noted that some control variables are reasonable proxies for factors that would almost automatically produce demand for social spending. One could argue that demographic variables-such as the percent elderly -contaminate other covariates and should thus not be included in the empirical specifications below. Indeed, because the elderly receive a disproportionate share of the largest social expenditure categories -pensions and health care -there are spillover effects to the other covariates and to social spending; see 24 See Castles (2002 and ), Clayton and Pontusson (1998) , and Van Vliet (2010) . 25 See among others Cantillon et al (2003) , Kenworthy (1999 , p. 12), OECD (2008 , Noland and Marx (2009, p. 329) . It should be noted that other factors could to be examined as well in a cross-country analysis of poverty (for example individual and household characteristics, family structure and the number of workers in the household), but are not included in the empirical analysis due to lack of data. 3 ). Finally, we will employ a panel analysis to take into account spill-over effects of social spending to several other covariates (section 5.4). All these approaches provide evidence that social spending appears to be a driving force as far as differences in poverty levels across countries is concerned, although other factors may have some effect too.
Straightforward approach for several moments in time
Our first estimation strategy is uncomplicated as we use a OLS approach to test the significance of the estimated coefficients, for around 1985, around 1995 and for around 2005. The estimations are presented in Table 5 . Note that the model -shown in Column 1 -generate similar results for the gross total social expenditure variable, which is significant (adjusted R 2 >.59; p<.01), during last two decades. Social spending appears to be important as far as differences in poverty levels across countries are concerned, although the proportion elderly (in 1985) and unemployment rates (in 1985) seem to have some effect too; compare columns 1 and 2. Separately, most variables are significantly correlated with poverty levels across countries for all data years (1985, 1995, and 2005) , with the exception of the unemployment rate; see Table A4 of the Appendix for details. Across countries unemployment is not well correlated with either market income poverty or disposable income poverty (Smeeding, 2005, p. 973, and Marx, 2009, p. 328) ). Moreover, we hardly find any significant coefficients if gross total social expenditure is taken into account as well. For example, we still find a pretty good fit for the social expenditure ratio in case a demographic control variable is taken into account, but the effect of the percentage of population aged 65 and above does not significantly differ from 0 (with the exception for the mid-1980's). This means that developments in the ageing of the population do not add that much to an explanation for differences in poverty outcomes across countries, although multicollinearity is involved in our multiple regression. The same holds for GDP per capita, and for several other insignificant control proxies we have applied (e.g. migration as percentage of total population as measured by the UN International Migration Report 2006; not shown). For the mid-1980's, we find a significant coefficient for the unemployment rate variable, but this result is not repeated for later years, probably due to both lower unemployment rates and more generous benefits since. All other results are rather steady over time (1985, 1995 and 2005) .
Sampled data set model approach: decomposition of regions
In line with the work of Swabish et al (2006) , we have constructed a sample with 103 different sets of observations for our 24 countries, using data from OECD (2008, on poverty rates), SOCX (2008, on social expenditures), and OECD.StatsExtracts (2010, on control variables). 21 countries enter with four or five observations (around 1985, around 1990, around 1995, around 2000 and around 2005) , and 3 countries enter with less observations (Australia, Switzerland, and Turkey) . This sampled data set model improves the degree of freedom substantially (N*T=103), allowing us to distinguish between non-EU15 countries (N*T=34) and EU15 countries (N*T=69).
Following the single equation format outlined in the previous section, we present Pearson correlation coefficients for poverty rates with a set of several social expenditures ratios, and on a set of demographic and macroeconomic covariates; see Table 6 . We ran several Pearson correlation tests with a breakdown of public and private social expenditure, also correcting for social health expenditures. The results provide clear evidence: social spending does seem to matter as far as differences in poverty levels across countries is concerned, although the ageing of the population, unemployment rates and GDP per capita may have some effect too. Table 6 reports some profound differences between non-EU15 and EU15 countries. For non-EU15 countries the correlation coefficient of poverty and public social spending is higher compared to EU15 countries, indicating that especially public programs are more targeted to the ones in need outside Europe. Moreover, an increase of private social arrangements by one percent of GDP alleviate poverty in EU15 countries, while private arrangements increases poverty in non-EU15 countries (although both correlation coefficients are not significant). The correlation coefficient of the unemployment rate is statistically significant, although solely for the group of EU15 countries. The coefficient is positive, suggesting that (higher) poverty rates and (higher) unemployment rates goes along in EU15. This is an interesting finding, because other studies including non-EU15 countries do find that unemployment is not well correlated with either market income poverty or disposable income poverty (Smeeding, 2005, p. 973) . Our other control variable -GDP per capita as a proxy of rich countries -does not affect poverty levels in EU15 countries, although this correlation coefficient is significant for non-EU15 countries. Note that the correlation coefficient for the proportion of elderly does not statistically differs from zero in EU15 countries. This may come as a surprise, because it was expected that the ageing of the population increases poverty. Even in Europe minimum safety nets are rarely sufficient to protect people from poverty; only a few countries provide workless households with a minimum income and related (i.e. housing) benefits that are sufficient to lift them close to or above the poverty line. However, this result fit in with empirical findings by others. Osberg (2000) , for example, showed that the fraction of elderly households in a nation does not affect income distribution comparisons across countries largely, because the elderly have levels of inequality that are similar to those of the non-elderly. A comprehensive study of demographic effects was carried out by Rainwater and Smeeding (2003) . They took the demography of each nation (relative numbers of single parents, elders, families with children, childless adults, etc.) and its income package (taxes and benefits) and simulated the U.S. demography with the packages of each nation. The effects of demography were very smallthe effects of the income package accounted for over 90 percent of the differences across nations. It should however be noted that establishing causation is problematic in such a single equation cross-sectional model. One could argue that causation plausibly runs from the right hand side and thus a higher level of poverty rates may well produce greater needs for social expenditures. Moreover, our multiple Pearson correlation matrix in Table A5 of the Appendix illustrates that several independent variables are highly correlated, especially social expenditure ratios with the proportion of elderly among total population. Since the elderly receive a large share of the largest social expenditure categories -social retirement and health care -there are spill-over effects to the other covariates of social spending. To tackle this problem, we will employ a method of ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors and a first-order autocorrelation correction.
Panel analysis
So far, we analyzed the data in different parts, either per year of per region. To get a better understanding of the relationship between poverty and gross social expenditure, while taking into account the demographic features and economic cycles, the study uses a pooled time series analysis of the 24 countries and the five points in time. We analyze the data using Beck and Katz's (1995) method of ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors (OLS-PCSE) and a first-order autocorrelation correction (AR1). We construct models for various kinds of social expenditure. Model 1 includes gross total social expenditure, Model 2 adds in gross public social expenditure, Model 3 contains both public and private social expenditures, and Model 4 examines gross total social expenditure other than health. The results of the pooled time series analysis are reported in Table 7 (the models do include country and period dummies, but these are not included in the table). With regards to the effects of ageing, unemployment, and GDP per capita, the following can be concluded. First, there is a positive and significant relationship between ageing and poverty levels. Secondly, although unemployment has a positive sign in all models, its effect is not always significant. This may indicate that the relationship between unemployment and poverty is related to the type of social expenditure. Thirdly, GDP per capita turns out not to be significantly related to poverty levels if the other variables are also included in the model. Overall, the models shows that gross total social expenditure and gross public social expenditure are negatively related to poverty, but that private social expenditure and gross total social expenditure other than health are not significantly related to levels of poverty. Moreover, the resulting outcomes do differ compared to the earlier findings reported in this paper; the coefficients are lower, because they are controlled for demographic and cyclical factors. Poverty alleviation is an important objective of many countries. This paper analyzes the effect of social transfer policies on poverty. A vast literature claims that high social effort goes along with low poverty levels across countries. This paper systematically analyzes this claim. We take into account 28 OECD countries and distinguish between EU15 countries and non-EU15 countries -with special attention to the United States -to investigate whether both groups of countries generate (dis)similar results with their systems of income transfers. We employ several social expenditure ratios (as a proxy for social effort) and correct for the impact of the tax system and for private social arrangements, using OECD methodology. Other institutional features considering social spending are taken into account too (health programs). And finally ,we control for demographic and macro-economic differences across countries. We performed several tests with the most recent data (LIS, OECD, and SOCX) for the period 1985-2005. Our results are less clear-cut than earlier findings. We still find a quite strong negative relationship between the level of public social expenditure and poverty among 28 OECD countries. However, for non-EU15 countries this relationship is stronger -even when expenditures for health programs are excluded. The results alter considerably if private social expenditures are included as well. For non-EU15 countries in our sample, we do not find evidence for a negative correlation between the level of total social spending and the incidence of poverty. In contrast, for the group of EU15 countries private social arrangements do matter as far as poverty alleviation is concerned. These results did not alter over the last two decades. Demographic and macro-economic (control) variables are important as well. We developed and employed multiple linear regression models to control for these complex interrelationships. Our results point at one direction: gross social spending is the driving force as far as differences in poverty levels across countries are concerned, although the ageing of the population and unemployment rates have some explanatory power, both for non-EU15 countries and for EU15 countries.. Our analysis captures another effect as well. It is essential to control for the impact of taxes on the social expenditure ratios used. After controlling for taxes, the linkage between social effort and poverty levels across countries becomes insignificant. Considering that we have a much better -although still not perfect -measure of what governments really devote to social spending with these corrections on expenditure statistics, the familiar claim that higher social expenditure goes along with lower poverty levels does not hold across the 28 examined countries examined. We believe that our comparison of the impact of several social expenditure ratios on poverty levels in EU15 countries and in other non-EU15 and the United States emphasize that taking into account both the public/private-mix and the impact of the tax system on social expenditure ratios really matters for comparative welfare state research and for policy makers who want to reduce poverty. -OECD-30 and EU-15 -Data years: 2003 -Poverty rates at PL 40, at PL 50, and at PL 60 -Poverty gap at PL 50 - OECD-26, and EU-15 -Data years: mid-1980s, 1990 , mid-1990s, 2000 , mid-2000 -Poverty rates at PL 50 -Source: OECD (2008) Gross and net social expenditure (% GDP) -OECD-26 and EU-14 -Data years: 1993 , 1997 , 2001 , 2003 -Gross public social expenditure -Net public social expenditure -Gross total social expenditure -Net total social expenditure -Source: Adema (2001) 
APPENDIX: DATA AND CORRELATION TESTS ACROSS COUNTRIES
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A3: REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR POVERTY RATES AND GROSS SOCIAL SPENDING OVER TIME
To test for (in)stability over the business cycle, we present the linkage between poverty rates and several social expenditure indicators for a few moments in time for all countries where all relevant data items are available. Our findings are rather steady over time. Note that the correlation coefficients and significance of all linkages between social expenditure and poverty rates across countries are rather insensitive for poverty lines and/or data sets employed. However, the results are sensitive for the social indicator used. We find pretty good fits for gross public social expenditures, both for non-EU15 and EU15 countries. However, the inclusion of private social expenditures alters the picture. Still, we find a significant negative relationship between social spending and poverty rates for all countries and for EU15 countries, but not for non-EU15 countries separately. We find a fit again for non-EU15 countries when social expenditures for health programs are excluded from social spending ratios. 
Panel
